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UNIQUENESS IN INTERACTION GAMES
BY ROBIN MASON AND ÁKOS VALENTINYI
Abstract
This paper shows that incomplete information and sufficient heterogeneity
of players can ensure uniqueness in interaction games. In contrast to re-
cent work on uniqueness in interaction games, we do not require strategic
complementarity. There are two parts to the argument. First, if a player’s
signal is sufficiently uninformative of the signals of its opponents (in the
sense of the Fisher information of the signal), then the player’s best re-
sponse to any strategy profile of its opponents is non-decreasing in its sig-
nal. Secondly, a contraction mapping argument shows that sufficient het-
erogeneity ensures that equilibrium is unique.
Keywords: Co-ordination, Interaction games, Heterogeneity, Unique
equilibrium
JEL Classification: C72; D82
ROBIN MASON – VALENTINYI ÁKOS
FÜGGETLENSÉG, HETEROGENITÁS ÉS AZ EGYENSÚLY
EGYÉRTELMŰSÉGE INTERAKCIÓS JÁTÉKOKBAN
Összefoglaló
A tanulmány megmutatja, hogy tökéletlen információ és megfelelő hetero-
genitás biztosítja az egyensúly egyértelműségét interakciós játékokban.
Ellentétben az egyensúly egyértelműségére vonatkozó korábbi eredmé-
nyekkel, mi nem tételezzük fel, hogy a játékosok akciói között stratégiai
komplementaritás áll fenn.
Bizonyításunknak két része van. Először megmutatjuk, hogy ha egy játékos
által kapott jelzés kellőképpen kevés információt tartalmaz a többi játékos
által kapott jelzésről, akkor a játékos optimális stratégiája a kapott jelzés
növekvő függvénye függetlenül attól, hogy ellenfelei milyen stratégiát ját-
szanak. Másodszor, megmutatjuk, hogy ha az információ megfelelő, hete-
rogenitása biztosítja az egyensúly egyértelműségét.1 Introduction
Complete information interaction games (which include co-ordination, random matching
and local interaction games—see Morris (1997)) often have multiple equilibria. In this
paper, we show that when there is incomplete information, independence and suﬃcient
heterogeneity of players can ensure uniqueness in this class of games. For any bounded
interaction between players, we derive conditions under which a player’s best response to
any strategy proﬁle of its opponents is a non-decreasing strategy or ‘threshold strategy’;1
and under which there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies. Both parts require
that
1. each player’s payoﬀ is suﬃciently sensitive to its own signal;
2. each player’s payoﬀ is suﬃciently insensitive to the actions of other player;
3. each player’s signal is suﬃciently uninformative about the signals of other players;
and
4. the conditional probability of any signal is suﬃciently small.
In the case of the normal distribution, the condition can be expressed simply in terms
of the correlation ρ and variance σ of the signal distribution: for any suﬃciently large σ,
there is a critical ρ∗, strictly between 0 and 1, such that if the degree of correlation is
less than ρ∗, then any equilibrium must be in threshold strategies and there is a unique
threshold strategy equilibrium. The result can be extended to more general distributions.
Then what matters is the Fisher information—a measure of how sensitive the likelihood of
other players’ signals is to the signal of an individual player—and the conditional density.
The suﬃcient condition for uniqueness is that the Fisher information is bounded (i.e., a
player’s signal tells it little about the signals of other players); and that the conditional
density also is bounded.
Previous work has shown in a variety of situations that heterogeneity can help to
ensure uniqueness of equilibrium. For example, in a canonical two-by-two public good
1A threshold strategy in a binary action game, for example, speciﬁes that one action is taken only for
signals above some cutoﬀ point.
2model in Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, pp. 211–213), there are two pure strategy equilibria
in the common knowledge game. There is only one equilibrium in the incomplete infor-
mation game if the distribution of types satisﬁes certain conditions. One such condition is
that the maximum value of the density is suﬃciently small; following Grandmont (1992),
this can be interpreted as requiring a suﬃcient degree of heterogeneity between the play-
ers. Herrendorf et al. (2000) show how heterogeneity in the manufacturing productivity
(rather than the information) of agents in the two-sector, increasing returns-to-scale Mat-
suyama (1991) model can remove indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibrium. Burdzy
et al. (2000) show in a dynamic game that if agents are heterogeneous (in the sense of
being unable to adjust behaviour at identical times), then exogenous shocks can lead to
a unique equilibrium in the Matsuyama setting. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002) show
that if there is not too much heterogeneity among players, then there can be multiple
equilibria in social interaction games.
The global games literature (see Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin
(1998), and Morris and Shin (2002b)) also provides suﬃcient conditions for equilibrium
uniqueness. These papers require that the players’ actions are strict strategic comple-
ments i.e., a player’s incentive to choose an action is increasing in the proportion of
other players who choose that action.2 Equilibrium uniqueness in a global game also
requires suﬃciently small heterogeneity—the players’ signals must be suﬃciently infor-
mative about the true underlying state, and hence highly correlated.
In this paper, we identify clearly the mechanism that is at work to establish uniqueness
when there is a large degree of heterogeneity. We are able to contrast the mechanism with
iterated deletion of dominated strategies based on higher-order beliefs that operates in the
global game models.3 With higher-order beliefs, suﬃcient (but not perfect) correlation
between signals/types is required. Our mechanism relies on suﬃcient lack of correlation
between signals. With independence of players’ signals, the best response for any player
2Strictly speaking, Carlsson and van Damme do not require strategic complementarity. But, as Morris
and Shin (2002a) note, when a two player, two action game has multiple Nash equilibria (the interesting
case for Carlsson and van Damme’s analysis), there are automatically strategic complementarities.
3Global games are supermodular, so that payoﬀs are strictly increasing in the mass of agents taking
the same action. It is this structure that allows iterated deletion of dominated strategies; see Milgrom
and Roberts (1990).
3to any strategy by all other players is a threshold strategy. It is then straightforward to
establish that there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies if and only if there
is suﬃcient heterogeneity of signals. The analysis therefore resolves an open question
concerning how diﬀerent forms of heterogeneity can ensure uniqueness.
Our results are also of applied relevance. There is an increasing number of applications
of the global game framework. Morris and Shin (1998) use the idea to analyze currency
attacks and Morris and Shin (forthcoming) use it to analyze the pricing of debt. Karp
(1999) applies it to Krugman (1991)’s two-sector model. In all these papers, strategic
complementarity is assumed. But there are many applications in which this assumption
is inappropriate, and where it would (for the usual reasons) be very useful to have a
unique equilibrium. For example, in industrial organization, it is reasonable that positive
network eﬀects might hold in a new market when a small number of ﬁrms have entered;
but that the network eﬀects become negative once too many ﬁrms enter and the market
becomes crowded. In the Internet, each new web site, or the addition of information to
an existing site, increases the value of the Internet to every existing user. However, as
usage of the Internet grows, so does congestion. Goldstein and Pauzner (2002) study a
model of bank runs based on Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In their model, an agent’s
incentive for early withdrawal of funds from a bank is non-monotonic in the number of
agents withdrawing. The incentive is highest when the number of agents demanding
withdrawal reaches the level at which the bank goes bankrupt; after that point, the
incentive decreases. (Despite this lack of complete strategic complementarity, Goldstein
and Pauzner are able to establish uniqueness of equilibrium.) We do not require global
strategic complementarities, only bounded interactions; hence our results can be used in
a wider range of applications.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we analyze a simple
model, based on a particular payoﬀ function and the normal distribution, to make the
basic points of the paper. We extend the analysis in section 3 to show how the conclusions
can be generalized to other distributions and payoﬀs. Section 4 concludes. Longer proofs
are in the appendix.
42 A Simple Model
Suppose that there is a continuum of players, of measure 1. There are two possible
actions. The payoﬀ to any player from action 0 is zero. The payoﬀ to player i from action
1 is γˆ x + (1 − γ)xi + f(n). xi is player i’s private signal, observed only by player i. It
is drawn from a normal distribution with mean y and variance σ2. Players’ signals are
correlated—the degree of correlation between the signals of player i and j 6= i is ρ ∈ [0,1)
(note that perfect correlation is ruled out). Hence when player i has a private signal
of xi, its posterior of the signal x−i of any player −i is normally distributed with mean
ρxi + (1 − ρ)y and variance σ2(1 − ρ2). y,σ2 and ρ are common knowledge. ˆ x is the
mean signal of all players; unconditionally, it is equal to y. The parameter γ lies in the
interval [0,1]; if it is equal to 0, the model is one of private values; if it is 1, it is a pure
common value model; for intermediate values of γ, there is a limited degree of common
value. Finally, n ∈ [0,1] is the proportion of players choosing action 1. f : [0,1] → R
is the interaction function, describing how a player’s utility is aﬀected by the actions of
other players. We assume that it is continuous and bounded i.e., there exists a ﬁnite
κ such that supn∈[0,1] |f(n)| ≤ κ/2. The assumption implies that there are dominance
regions: any rationalizable strategy must involve playing 0 for any valuation less than
¯
x ≡ −supf, and playing 1 for any valuation greater than ¯ x ≡ −inf f.
Consider any strategy proﬁle played by all players other than i. This proﬁle induces
a distribution s(x) : R → [0,1] that gives the proportion of players choosing action 1 for
a given value of x. The expected utility gain for player i of choosing action 1, conditional
on receiving the signal xi, is then





















So player i’s expected utility has two components: the expected stand-alone utility (the
ﬁrst line of the expression), and the expected interaction utility (the second line).
52.1 The Independent Private Value Case
Consider ﬁrst the case of independent signals (ρ = 0) and private values (γ = 0). Clearly
in this case, the expected interaction utility does not depend on player i’s signal. It is then
straightforward that E[∆u(xi,s)] is a strictly increasing function of xi for any s(·). And,
because of the dominance regions, this means that the best response to any distribution
s(·) induced by any strategy proﬁle is a threshold strategy.
Proposition 1 In the independent private value case, γ = ρ = 0, the best response






0 x < ˜ x,
1 x ≥ ˜ x
for some ˜ x ∈ (
¯
x, ¯ x).
Hence, any equilibrium must be in threshold strategies. Given the threshold point ˜ x in
a symmetric threshold strategy equilibrium, the expected utility of a player who receives
a signal ˜ x is
































The equilibrium threshold point satisﬁes the equation
E[∆u(˜ x)] = 0. (3)
MS show in the case of strict strategic complements (i.e., f(·) strictly increasing) that a
necessary and suﬃcient condition for there to be a unique solution to equation (3) is that
σ is suﬃciently large i.e., that there is enough heterogeneity. A similar argument is given
in HVW, who give a suﬃcient, but not necessary condition based on heterogeneity. The
6next proposition shows that the assumption of strategic complementarity is not needed
for this result.
Proposition 2 For any continuous and bounded interaction function f(·), in the inde-
pendent private value case, there exists a σ∗ ≥ 0 such that if σ > σ∗, then there is a
unique equilibrium .
Proof. There is a unique rationalizable action for (almost) all signals iﬀ dE[∆u(˜ x)]/d˜ x >






















which completes the proof. ￿
2.2 Positive Correlation and Common Values
Now suppose that there is a degree of correlation: ρ ∈ (0,1), and of common values:
γ ∈ (0,1]. In this section, we derive joint conditions on heterogeneity σ, correlation
ρ, the common value parameter γ and the interaction function bound κ such that the
best response of player i to any strategy proﬁle played by all other players is a threshold
strategy. Once this fact is established, suﬃcient heterogeneity again ensures uniqueness
of equilibrium. Hence the basic mechanism that generates uniqueness in the case of
independence extends to positive, but limited correlation, and to common values.
Proposition 3 If








then the best response to any strategy proﬁle is a threshold strategy.
7(The proposition follows from straightforward and lengthy algebra and so the proof is
relegated to the appendix.)
In order to establish uniqueness of equilibrium in the correlated, common value case,
we now derive a condition for there to be a unique threshold strategy equilibrium, assum-
ing that such an equilibrium exists. This result is stated in proposition 4; as in proposition
2, it basically requires suﬃciently large heterogeneity (for any given values of ρ and κ).
We then combine the results of propositions 3 and 4 to give a suﬃcient condition for
equilibrium uniqueness.
Proposition 4 If









and a threshold strategy equilibrium exists, then there is a unique threshold strategy equi-
librium.
Proof. As in the proof of proposition 2, there is a unique threshold strategy action for
(almost) all signals iﬀ dE[∆u(˜ x)]/d˜ x > 0 for any ˜ x at which E[∆u(˜ x)] = 0, where









































Diﬀerentiation shows that a suﬃcient condition for dE[∆u(˜ x)]/d˜ x > 0 is










This completes the proof. ￿
8Proposition 5 If













then there is a unique equilibrium (which is in threshold strategies).
Proof. To have a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies, equations (4) and (5) must















for ρ ∈ [
1
2,1).
So condition (5) implies (4) for ρ ∈ (0, 1
2] while the converse holds for ρ ∈ [1
2,1). The
result follows. ￿
Proposition 5 gives a joint condition on the model parameters ρ,σ,γ and κ that is
suﬃcient for equilibrium uniqueness. The proposition is illustrated in ﬁgures 1 and 2,
which give an intuitive interpretation of the result.
Three facts stand out from the ﬁgures. First, our suﬃcient condition for uniqueness
of equilibrium is stricter than that of MS. In ﬁgure 1, for example, the MS result gives
a unique equilibrium for all parameter values lying in the area under the upward-sloping
curve. We require in addition that parameter values lie in the area beneath the downward-
sloping line. But, in contrast to MS, we do not require that players’ actions are strategic
complements—proposition 5 holds for any bounded interactions between the players. So,
while our suﬃcient condition is indeed stricter than MS’s when actions are strategic
complements, it is less strict in the sense that it applies to a larger class of games.
Secondly, the ﬁgures demonstrate the statements made in the introduction of the
paper—that there is a unique equilibrium (in threshold strategies) if and only if there
is suﬃcient heterogeneity of signals. In ﬁgure 1, the suﬃcient condition requires the









Figure 1: Proposition 5 for the Pure Private Value Case
prior distribution suﬃciently high). (For certain parameter values, there is also a lower
bound on the value of ρ.) In contrast, the MS condition alone generally requires the
degree of correlation to be suﬃciently high.
Finally, comparison of the two ﬁgures shows that allowing for common values de-
creases the parameter space over which the suﬃcient condition in proposition 5 holds.
But the qualitative features of the result are unchanged by the presence of a common
value component in players’ payoﬀs. In this sense, the conclusion from the independent
private value case carries over to the correlated common value case. In all cases, strategic
complementarity is not required. This fact highlights that the mechanism at work here—
the conditions ensure that a threshold strategy is a best response to all other strategies;
and that there is a unique threshold strategy equilibrium—is quite diﬀerent from the


















Figure 2: Proposition 5 for the Pure Common Value Case
3 The General Model
The simple model establishes the role that independence, and hence small correlation,
plays in ensuring uniqueness in the interaction game. There is a possibility, however,
that the conclusions depend on the simplifying assumptions of the model. In this section,
we extend the model in a few directions to show that this is not the case. In particular,
we allow for a more general payoﬀ structure and distribution of signals.
3.1 The Private Value, Countable Action Case
Consider a game of incomplete information between a continuum of players of measure
1 where each player observes ﬁrst observes her own information, and then chooses an
action. Each player observes a signal xi drawn from a common distribution G(x) with
support X. Following Frankel et al. (2003), partition the set of players into a ﬁnite set T
of “types” of players. Each type contains either a single player or a continuum of players.
Moreover, each type is of ﬁnite measure (normalized so that the total population is of
measure 1). For each player i ∈ [0,1] let ti ∈ T be the type of i, and T−i the set of types
11of player i’s opponents.
The action set Ai of each player i is a closed, ﬁnite subset of the unit interval that
contains 0 and 1 i.e., {0,1} ⊆ Ai ⊂ [0,1]. Player i’s payoﬀ from choosing action ai ∈ Ai
on receiving a signal xi ∈ X and being of type ti ∈ T is ui(ai,xi,ti,α−i) where αt is the
cumulative distribution function (cdf) of actions chosen by type-t players (that is αt(a)
is the proportion of type t players who play action a or less), and α−i = (αt)t∈T−i is
the vector of cdfs of player i’s opponents. Note that players of the same type may have
diﬀerent payoﬀ functions and may have diﬀerent action sets. Note also that the game
is not truly anonymous. Within a type, players are anonymous; but a player’s identity




i,xi,ti,α−i) ≡ ui(ai,xi,ti,α−i) − ui(a
0
i,xi,ti,α−i).
We make the following assumptions on payoﬀ functions.
U1. Limit Dominance. There exist
¯
xi and ¯ xi such that
(a) ∆ui(0,a0
i,xi,ti,α−i) > 0 for all a0




i,xi,ti,α−i) > 0 for all a0




xi and ¯ x = supi∈[0,1] ¯ xi.
U2. Uniformly Positive Sensitivity to State. There is a δ ∈ (0,∞) such that for
all ai ≥ a0
i, xi ≥ x0



































and At = ∪j|tj=tAj, for all i and ti.
We make the following assumptions about the players’ signals.
D1. G(x) is atomless and its support X includes [
¯
x, ¯ x]. The density g(x) is bounded.
The conditional density g(x|xi) is diﬀerentiable with respect to xi.








is the Fisher information in xi about the signal of the opponents.
D3. For all x,xi ∈ X, there is a η ∈ [0,+∞) such that g(x|xi) ≤ η.
Players use distributional strategies. A distributional strategy for player i is a proba-
bility measure on Ai×X×T such that the marginal distribution on X is g(x); see Milgrom
and Weber (1985). Let µi(xi,ti) be the cumulative distribution function of player i of type
ti who receives a signal xi i.e., µi(a,xi,ti) is the probability that player i plays ai ≤ a if
he receives signal xi and is of type ti. Let µt(a,x) =
R
j|tj=t µj(a,x,tj)dj be the cdf played
by type t players, µ−i(a,x) = (µt(a,x))t∈T−i be the corresponding vector of opponents’
cdfs, and µ(a,x) = (µt(a,x))t∈T be the vector of cdfs of all types. The expected payoﬀ





In the next lemma (the proof of which is in the appendix), we derive a suﬃcient
condition that ensures that a player’s expected payoﬀ function satisﬁes the strict single
crossing condition. We then use this property in proposition 6 to argue that all players
use threshold strategies i.e., strategies that are non-decreasing in their signal.
13Lemma 1 If assumptions U1–U3 and D1–D2 hold and ι < δ/κ, then player i’s expected




i,ti,µ−i)] implies E[ui(ai,xi,ti,µ−i)] > E[ui(a0
i,xi,ti,µ−i)]
for any ai,a0
i ∈ Ai and for all xi > x0
i.
Proposition 6 If assumptions U1–U3 and D1–D2 hold and ι < δ/κ, then the best re-
sponse of player i to any proﬁle of opponents’ strategies is monotone non-decreasing in
her signal xi.
Proof. The action set Ai is totally ordered because {0,1} ⊆ Ai ⊂ [0,1] implying that
E[ui(ai,xi,ti,µ−i)] is quasisupermodular in ai. Moreover, Ai is independent of xi, and
X ∈ R is also totally ordered. Finally, E[ui(ai,xi,ti,µ−i)] satisﬁes the strict single crossing
property when ι < δ/κ, from lemma 1. Therefore by the Monotone Selection Theorem 4’
of Milgrom and Shannon (1990),
s
∗
i(xi,ti,µ−i) = arg max
ai∈Ai
E[ui(ai,xi,ti,µ−i)]
is monotone non-decreasing in xi. ￿
The suﬃcient condition in proposition 6 that ensures that each agent plays a threshold
strategy is stronger than that found in the simple model of section 2 (see proposition 2).









The factor of 2π that does not appear in the bound in this section means that the
suﬃcient condition in proposition 6 is more demanding. Nevertheless, it is doing much
the same work as the condition in proposition 4. Both require that a player’s signal tells
14it suﬃciently little about the signals of other players—in the case of proposition 4, by
ensuring that heterogeneity is suﬃciently large and/or correlation suﬃciently small; in
the case of proposition 6, by bounding the Fisher information.
The second step is to show that there is a unique equilibrium in threshold strategies.
The direct argument for this step used in the simple model of the previous section cannot
be applied in this more general model. MS and Frankel et al. (2003) show that the
extension of this argument to a more general model with (potentially) asymmetric players
requires the assumption of strategic complementarity.4 In order to generalize beyond
strict strategic complementarity, we use an argument that establishes that the mapping
deﬁning the equilibrium distribution is a contraction under a particular metric.








where λ < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium (which is in threshold strategies).
The proof of the proposition, contained in the appendix, is technical and long. But the
end result is simple, requiring only that ι be less than δ/κ − η/λ. Note that compared
to proposition 6, which requires only that ι is less than δ/κ, the suﬃcient condition in
proposition 7 is stricter.
What is condition (7) ensuring? It does the two things that were illustrated in the
simple model in section 2. First, it ensures that a player’s own signal dominates interaction
eﬀects in payoﬀ terms enough to make any best response a non-decreasing pure strategy.
Roughly speaking, if condition (7) is satisﬁed, then each player places more weight on its
own signal than on the possible actions of its opponents when choosing its best action.
Secondly, the condition ensures that there is a unique equilibrium in non-decreasing pure
strategies. It does so by showing in the general case the mechanism that was shown for the
4By the results of Milgrom and Roberts (1990) on supermodular games, there exists a largest and a
smallest Nash equilibrium. Suppose that these are distinct equilibria. In a global game in which actions
are strategic complements, players’ payoﬀs are increasing in the level of the state, all other things equal,
and private signals of the state are suﬃciently precise, this leads to a contradiction.
15binary action case. In order for there to be multiple equilibria in non-decreasing strategies,
it must be that there are multiple values of a player’s signal that leaves that player
indiﬀerent between the two actions. The direct eﬀect of a player’s signal is monotonic: the
utility diﬀerence between the actions increases with the signal, other things equal. So, in
order for there to be multiple equilibria, the indirect eﬀect, operating through the player’s
assessment of its opponents’ actions, must dominate. Condition (7) ensures that the
direct, own-signal eﬀect is suﬃciently strong; or that the interaction eﬀect is suﬃciently
weak; or that the player’s signal is suﬃciently uninformative about the information (and
hence likely action) of others. It therefore ensures that the direct eﬀect dominates and
multiplicity is not possible.
As a ﬁnal note, it is worth comparing condition (7) with condition (5) established in












in the private value case. (In fact, δ = 1 in the simple model; it is written here as a















where the expressions for the Fisher information and the maximum value of the density






















2π) > 1−1/λ, which certainly holds since λ < 1. In summary: the suﬃcient
condition in proposition 7 is stricter than the suﬃcient condition in proposition 4.
163.2 Extensions
The previous section established a suﬃcient condition for equilibrium uniqueness for the
case of private values and a ﬁnite action set for each player. In this section, we show that
extending the result beyond this case is straightforward.
To allow for interdependent values, now suppose the utility of player i of type ti ∈ T
receiving signal xi ∈ X from choosing action a ∈ A is ui(a,xi,ti,θ,α−i) where θ ∈ Xm
is an unobserved statistic of all (other) players’ signals. In order to avoid dealing with
inﬁnite-dimensional integrals, we assume that m is ﬁnite. In the private values case, ui
is not a function of θ for all i. Let h(θ|x) denote a player’s probability density function
for the statistic θ conditional on receiving a signal x, with support X. Note that the
conditional density h(·) is symmetric across players.
In line with the previous approach, we make the following additional assumptions:
U4. Bounded variation: For any actions ai,a0
i ∈ Ai, xi ∈ X, ti ∈ T and vector of oppo-
nents’ cdfs α−i, there exists a ω ∈ (0,+∞) such that Varθ [∆ut(ai,a0
i,xi,ti,θ,α−i)] ≤
ω2 where the variance is deﬁned in terms of the conditional density h(θ|xi).5
D4. For all xi ∈ X and θ ∈ Xm, there is a ν ∈ [0,+∞) such that h(θ|xi) ≤ ν.
With these two additional assumptions (and the previous assumptions adapted in an
obvious way), the arguments in the previous section can be applied to give equivalent
results. In particular,




















17(The proof of the proposition is very similar to the proof of proposition 7 and so is
omitted.) Proposition 8 shows that allowing for interdependent valuations modiﬁes the
suﬃcient condition for equilibrium uniqueness in a simple way. In particular, the bounding
parameter δ in the private value case can simply be replaced by the ratio of parameters,
δ/ω, which measures the relative importance of private and interdependent valuation
components.
Consider now the case where each player’s action set is a continuum. The argument
of Athey (2001) (theorem 2) can be used in a direct way to establish the uniqueness of
equilibrium in this case. One more assumption is required:
U5. Payoﬀ Continuity. Each ui(ai,xi,ti,α−i) is continuous in ai and α−i.
Then








where λ < 1, then there is a unique equilibrium in the interdependent valuation case with
a continuum of actions.
The proposition follows immediately from Athey (2001) and proposition 8 (noting that
any sequence that converges has a unique limit).
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a suﬃcient condition for there to be a unique equilibrium
in interaction games. Our framework can be applied to a broad class of games; for
example, we do not require the assumption of global strategic complementarity. We have
therefore been able to clarify the mechanism that is at work when heterogeneity generates
uniqueness. In addition to this theoretical contribution, our approach can be used in a
number of applications in which externalities can be both positive and negative.
18A Proof of Proposition 3
A suﬃcient condition for player i’s best response to any distribution s(·) induced by
any strategy proﬁle to be a threshold strategy is that the expected utility ∆u(xi,s) (see

























































































































































































Hence the suﬃcient condition is






19which proves the claim.
B Proof of Lemma 1








for xi > x0


























































i) − g(x|xi)]dx, (10)
where the last inequality follows from assumption U2 if we also take into account that
ai,a0
i ∈ [0,1].
























































































X g(x|xi)dx = 1 is independent of xi.











































where the last inequality follows from the observation that assumption U3 together with
|ai − a0
i| ≤ 1 and |α−i − α0







by κ2, and assumption 2 implies that Var[(∂ lng(x|xi))/(∂xi)|xi=ˆ xi] ≤ ι.







i,ti,µ−i)] ≥ (δ − κι)|xi − x
0
i|
which proves the lemma.
C Proof of Proposition 7
The following deﬁnition will be useful during the proof.
Deﬁnition 1 Let D denote the set of distribution functions deﬁned over X ×A (i.e., the
set of functions that are non-decreasing, left-continuous and have a range of [0,1]).
Write the action set of player i as Ai = {a0 = 0,ai
1,ai
2,...,ai
N = 1} where ai
n < ai
n+1.
For any given vector of distributions µ−i, deﬁne xi(an;µ−i) by
E[∆ui(an,an−1,xi(an;µ−i),ti,µ−i)] , 0 (13)
21i.e., the signal at which player i is indiﬀerent between actions an and an−1 for n ∈ [1,N].
Since the function ∆ui is strictly increasing in xi if δ/κ > ι, xi(an;µ−i) is uniquely deﬁned
by equation (13). Player i’s best response to the distribution µ−i can be represented as







1 x < xi(a;µ−i)






where µ−t is the vector of distributions induced by the strategies of all players who are not
of type t, for x ∈ X and a ∈ At ≡ ∪{i|ti=t}Ai. Notice that since φt is the sum of indicator
functions, it is non-decreasing, left-continuous in (a,x) and maps At ×X → [0,1]. Hence
φt is a distribution function i.e., φt ∈ D.
Let φ(a,x;µ) ≡ (φt)t∈T. φ maps the set Dτ into itself where τ is the number of types
i.e., τ = #T. An equilibrium is deﬁned by µ(a,x) = φ(a,x;µ).
Consider any two vectors of distribution functions µ = (µt)t∈T and µ0 = (µ0
t)t∈T











(This is a variant of the L1 metric, and so it is easy to show that it is indeed a metric.)
The space (D,kk) is complete: by Helly’s selection theorem (see Kolmogorov and Fomin
(1970), p. 373), a sequence of non-decreasing, uniformly bounded functions on X ⊆ R has
a subsequence that converges to a non-decreasing function. The objective is to establish
that the mapping φ is a contraction under the metric deﬁned in equation (14). Existence






















































































￿ ≤ λkµ − µ
0k (15)
where λ < 1. Notice that the existence of dominance regions means that the distances
deﬁned by the metric exist and are ﬁnite.





































23or η1 + η2 + η3 = 0. Hence |η1| = |η2 + η3| ≤ |η2| + |η3|. From assumptions U2–U4,
|η1| ≥ δ(an − an−1)|xi(an;µ−i)) − xi(an;µ
0
−i))|;
|η2| ≤ ικ(an − an−1)|xi(an;µ−i)) − xi(an;µ
0
−i))|;






where for any x ∈ X, |µ−i − µ0
−i| = supt∈T−i supa∈At |µt(x,a) − µ0
t(x,a)|.
Hence











































Hence the suﬃcient condition (15) for the contraction is satisﬁed if there is a number
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